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STA1EMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a permissive appeal arising from two interlocutory orders entered by the 
district court during Erick Hall's pending capital post-conviction proceedings. This 
Court granted Mr. Hall permission to appeal two issues: 1) whether the district court 
erred in prohibiting post-conviction contact with the jurors who deliberated in the 
underlying criminal case; and 2) whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Hall's 
motion for a court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels' investigator. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury found Erick Virgil Hall guilty of Murder in the First Degree, Rape, and 
Kidnapping in the First Degree, in Ada County Case No. H0300518. (R. 31528 Vol. IV, 
pp.661-671.)! Following the special sentencing hearing held pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515, 
the same jury found imposition of the penalty of death on Mr. Hall would not be unjust. 
(R. 31528 Vol. I, p. 48;167.) The judgment and sentence of death were pronounced on 
January 18, 2005, by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, District Judge of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in Ada County, Boise, Idaho. (R. 31528 Vol. IV, 
pp.655-660.) 
On March 1, 2005, Mr. Hall filed a timely petition for post_conviction relief 
pursuant to LC. § 19-2719, which initiated these capital post-conviction proceedings. (R. 
35055 Vol. I, pp.9-34.) During the course of post-conviction proceedings, the district 
court entered two separate orders at issue in this appeal: (l) an order prohibiting juror 
! Mr. Hall respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice of the record in the 
underlying criminal case, Supreme Court No. 31528. 
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contact, and (2) an order denying a motion to depose Glenn Elam, the investigator for 
Mr. Hall's trial counsel. 
The Order Prohibiting Juror Contact 
On October 31,2005, Mr. Hall and the State stipulated to the release of completed 
jury questionnaires, which had been provided to the parties to assist with jury selection in 
the underlying criminal case. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp.7l-73.) On January 6, 2006, a 
telephonic hearing was held regarding the stipulation during which the district court 
permitted the release of the jury questionnaires. In the course of discussing the 
questionnaires, the district court prohibited post-conviction counsel from contacting 
jurors without prior court approval. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1609; Tr. 4/09/09, p.7, L.3 -
p.24, L.17.) 
On January 20, 2006, Mr. Hall filed a motion asking the district court to 
reconsider its prohibition on juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp. 112-114.) On February 
15, 2006, at the conclusion of the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, .the district court 
prohibited Mr. Hall's counsel from contacting jurors, but stated it would entertain future 
motions on the matter. (Tr. 2/15/06, pA4, L.3 - pAS, L.15.) 
On June 1,2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for juror contact and a memorandum in 
support thereof, setting forth the legal grounds for his motion, the reasons he believed the 
jurors had information relevant to his post-conviction claims, the procedures his 
investigator would follow when contacting jurors, and the questions he intended to ask of 
those who chose to cooperate. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.961-963; R. Vol. VIII, p.1573 
(Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibit 12.).) In its response, the State conceded the district 
court could not prohibit all juror contact, and presented a proposed procedure for 
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limiting, but not prohibiting, juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.968-984.) The district 
court held a hearing on August 8, 2007, and denied the motion. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.l23, L.8-
p.145, L.21.) On September 13, 2007, the district court memorialized its order denying 
Mr. Hall's motion for juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. VI, pp.1020-1023.) 
The Order Denying The Deposition Of Mr. Hall's Investigator 
On January 5, 2006, Mr. Hall filed a motion for discovery in which he requested 
leave to depose his ·trial counsel and their investigator, Gleun Elam. (R. 35055 Vol. I, 
p.JOl.) At the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the district court granted Mr. Hall's request 
to depose trial counsel but denied, without prejudice, his request to depose Mr. Elam. (Tr. 
7/05/06, p.l77, L.19 -p.l81, L.21.) 
On December 29, 2006, after the completion of trial counsels' depositions, 
Mr. Hall filed a supplemental memorandum in support of, inter alia, a renewed motion to 
depose Mr. Elam, identifYing mUltiple claims to which Mr. Elam's testimony was 
relevant. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Exhibit 10, pp.20-2J.).) On January 16,2007, the 
district court denied Mr. HaJJ's renewed request to depose Mr. Elam. (R. 35055, Vol. V, 
p.884; Tr. 1116107, p.35, L.4 -p.36, L.2.) 
On June 1,2007, Mr. HaJJ filed a sealed supplemental motion for discovery? (R. 
35055 Vol. VIII, p.1572 (Exhibit 2).) On August 8, 2007, the district court again denied 
the request to depose Gleun Elam, suggesting that an affidavit from Mr. HaJJ's current 
counsel may be a better alternative. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.65, L20 - p.66, L5.) 
2 The hearing on the motion was not sealed. Because the parties have not yet agreed to 
unseal the motion for purposes of this appeal, Mr. Hall cites solely to the transcript of the 
hearing on the motion. 
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On September 17, 2007, the district court entered a written order denying 
Mr. Hall's request to depose Mr. Elarn, stating that "[n]o showing has been made by the 
petitioner that [the] deposition is necessary to protect his substantial rights." (R. 35055 
Vol. VI, p.l046.) 
The Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For Permissive Appeal 
On August 23, 2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for permission to appeal with the 
district court. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.996-1006.) Mr. Hall included an affidavit from his 
investigator, Michael Shaw, in which Mr. Shaw described the content of multiple 
interviews with Glenn Elarn and his unsuccessful attempts to obtain an affidavit from 
Mr. Elarn. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.l573 (Exhibit 13, Appendix 11, pp.I-3.).) 
On November 15,2007, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Hall's motion for 
permission to appeal, during which the court expounded upon its reasons for denying the 
deposition of Mr. Elam. (Tr. 11/15/07, p.17, L.16-p.21, L.23.) 
On November 29,2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for permission to appeal with this 
Court. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, pp.l570-1571.) On January 18, 2008, the district court 
entered its written order denying Mr. Hall's motion for permission to appeal. (R. 35055 
Vol. VIII, pp.l527-1528.) Subsequently, this Court entered an order granting Mr. Hall 
permission to appeal and Mr. Hall filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, 
pp.1565-1568.) Mr. Hall has not requested any extensions of time for purposes of filing 
this Appellant's Brief. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court's order forbidding any communications with jurors 
unless Mr. Hall can first demonstrate that such communications are necessary to 
protect his substantial rights, violates his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution? 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by forbidding Mr. Hall's attorneys 
and their agents from contacting jurors? 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Hall's motion for a 
court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels' investigator where the investigator 
could provide information relevant to his post-conviction claims but was 
unwilling to voluntarily provide an affidavit? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court's Order Forbidding Any Communications With Jurors Unless Mr. Hall 
Can First Demonstrate That Any Such Communications Are Necessary To Protect His 
Substantial Rights. Violates Mr. Hall's Rights Guaranteed By The First, Fifth, Eighth, 
And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution 
A. Introduction 
Without any evidence of unprofessional conduct by either party, the district court 
took the unprecedented measure of creating a rule governing jury contact in capital post-
conviction proceedings. By doing so, the district court imposed a prior restraint in 
violation of the First Amendment, impeded Mr. Hall's post-conviction investigation in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and eliminated an important 
procedural safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court has not clearly articulated the standard of review for the district court's 
order at issue in this case. However, Mr. Hall submits the appropriate standard of review 
is de novo since the issue involves a question of law. Cf State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 
197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998) ("Where this Court considers a claim that a statute is 
unconstitutional, we review the trial court's ruling de novo since it involves purely a 
question oflaw.") 
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C. The District Court's Order Forbidding Any Communications With Jurors 
Unless Mr. Hall Can First Demonstrate That Such Communications Are 
Necessary To Protect His Substantial Rights, Violates Mr. Hall's Rights 
Under The First, Fifth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The United 
States Constitution 
1. The District Court's Order Constitutes An Unconstitutional Prior Restraint 
In Violation Of Mr. Hall's First Amendment Rights 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. AMEND. I? In the 
First Amendment context, "[t]he term 'prior restraint' is used to describe administrative 
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the 
time that such communications are to occur." Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 
550 (1993) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). In this case, the district court's 
order constitutes a prior restraint because it forbids Mr. Hall's attorneys, and their agents, 
from communicating with the discharged jurors without first demonstrating such 
communication is necessary to protect Mr. Hall's substantial rights. 
Where First Amendment interests are at stake, the Court has a duty to conduct a 
searching, independent factual review of the full record. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of us., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) ("[A]n appellate court has an obligation to 
'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the 
j udgrnent does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. '" 
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 (1964))). In the context 
of attorney speech, a prior restraint will pass constitutional muster only if the targeted 
speech presents a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
3 The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 n.lO (1989). 
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proceeding." Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). In applying 
this standard, a reviewing court engages in a balancing of the State's interest in regulating 
the targeted speech, and the attorney's interest in free speech. The balancing process 
involves a four-step analysis: 1) identification of the attorney's interest in the targeted 
speech; 2) identification of the State's interest in regulating the attorney's speech; 3) 
whether the attorney's speech has a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the 
proceeding[;]" and 4) whether the regulation is "narrowly tailed" to achieve the State's 
interest.fd. at 1075-76. 
a. The Attorney's Interest In The Targeted Speech 
Mr. Hall has a constitutional right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings. 
See, e.g., State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing that 
capital post-conviction proceedings serve to protect a condemned person's federal and 
state right to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 
(Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful 
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"). 
Pursuant to Idaho law, Mr. Hall essentially has one opportunity to raise all challenges to 
his conviction and sentence. See, I.C. § 19-2719(4)-(6); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700-01, 992 P.2d 144, 149-50 (1999). Mr. Hall's failure to assert a claim in his 
original petition is deemed to be a waiver of any claims that were known, or should have 
been known, at that time. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 
(1991). Thus, Mr. Hall has a substantial interest in communicating with the jurors in his 
case, as such communication is necessary to protect his right to meaningful post-
conviction proceedings. See infra Argument LC.2. In order to protect Mr. Hall's right to 
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meaningful post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Hall's attorneys have a duty to investigate 
potential juror misconduct and bias where there is reason to believe that the verdict may 
be subject to legal challenge. See, e.g.,ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards, Defense 
Function, Standard 4-7.3 ( c )("After discharge of the jury from further consideration of the 
case, ... [i]f defense counsel believes that the verdict may be subject to legal challenge, 
he or she may properly, if no statute or rule prohibits such course, communicate with 
jurors to determine whether such challenge may be available."). 
b. The State's Interest In Regulating The Attorney's Speech 
Mr. Hall concedes the State has a legitimate interest in protecting discharged 
jurors from harassment, and in preserving both the freedom of juror deliberations and the 
finality of verdicts. Cf Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 137 (1987) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, pursuit of these interests should not 
undermine other substantial State interests, including the interest in promoting justice and 
public confidence in the judicial process. Accordingly, rules adopted to achieve the 
State's interests should be flexible enough to accommodate any countervailing interests. 
See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915) ("It would not be safe to lay down 
any inflexible rule because there might be instances in which such testimony of the juror 
could not be excluded without violating the plainest principles of justice. This might 
occur in the gravest and most important cases .... ") (internal quotes omitted». 
This Court has created and adopted a series of rules and instructions designed to 
afford the flexibility required to further the State's interests including the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and the Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions. (See infra Argument I.C.l.c (addressing rules and instructions in detail).) In 
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the course of interpreting these rules, especially the Rules of Evidence, this Court, as well 
as the Court of Appeals, has avoided a rigid interpretation of the rules, recognizing such 
application may, in some instances, be counterproductive. For example, in Roll v. City of 
Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 771 P.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals considered 
the appropriate standard of prejudice necessary for a new trial. In rejecting an "actual 
prejudice test," the court stated that "the extreme rigor" of such a test "would severely 
restrict the availability of relief for [juror] misconduct, thereby diminishing public 
confidence in the jury system and eroding the fundamental principle that a verdict must 
be based upon the evidence developed at the trial." Id. at 837, 771 P.2d at 58. Similarly, 
this Court has refused to rigidly interpret LR.E. 606 (b) so as to completely foreclose the 
admissibility of juror affidavits in the context of a constitutional violation, even if the 
affidavits would be inadmissible under the plain language of the rule. State v. DeGrat, 
128 Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571 (1996) (recognizing circumstances in which a 
"constitutional exception" might apply to the exclusionary provisions of the rule). 
Indeed, experience teaches that freedom of speech, even if such speech is deemed 
inadmissible as a matter of law, can further the State's interest in improving the judicial 
system. For example, as demonstrated in Watson v. Navistar In!'l Transp. Corp., 121 
Idaho 643, 671, 827 P.2d 656, 684 (1992) (Bakes, C.J., concurring specially), and 
Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 511, 757 P.2d 1222, 1230 (Ct. App. 1988) (Burnett, 
J., specially concurring), juror affidavits that were deemed inadmissible led to 
improvements in the judicial system by revealing flaws in jury instructions to be 
corrected in future proceedings. 
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Notably, in the absence of a rule or statute forbidding juror contact, Idaho district 
courts have generally pennitted post-verdict connnunications with jurors without 
incident, and in some cases, have encouraged the investigation of potential juror claims. 
For example, in State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 922 P.2d 960 (1991), the district court 
pennitted post-trial interviews of jurors and even authorized the defense to hire an 
investigator for that purpose. Indeed, the admissibility of juror affidavits from such 
interviews is a matter that Idaho district courts, as well as appellate courts, have 
historically addressed without diminishing the sanctity of juror deliberations, or 
otherwise undennining the public's confidence in the judicial system. See, e.g., Roberts v. 
State, 132 Idaho 494, 495-496, 975 P.2d 782, 783-784 (1999) (excluding affidavits of 
jurors interviewed during post-conviction investigation); State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 
635, 38 P.3d 1285, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting that investigator contacted and 
interviewed jurors post-trial in attempt to support motion for new trial); State v. Webster, 
123 Idaho 233, 846 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1993) (mentioning that four jurors were contacted 
post-trial); Watson v. Navistar Int'/ Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643,827 P.2d 656 (1992) 
(recognizing that a party "has no way of knowing whether a verdict was [impennissibleJ 
until some of the jurors are interviewed."). 
In conclusion, Mr. Hall concedes the State has an interest in regulating attorney 
speech. However, the State has an equally important interest in promoting justice and 
public confidence in the judicial process which can be frustrated by over-regulating 
attorney speech. Thus, when reviewing the prior restraint imposed by the district court, 
Mr. Hall submits the Court should continue its practice of weighing all of the interests at 
stake, in light of the experience and practice in Idaho courts. 
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c. The Targeted Speech Does Not Present A Substantial Likelihood Of 
Materially Prejudicing The Proceeding 
The district court's order targets all communications Mr. Hall's attorneys might 
have with jurors, without regard for whether th'e communications have a "substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing" the proceedings. Gentile v. State Bar o/Nevada, 501 
U.S. 1030, 1075-76 (1991) (holding attorney's pretrial statements to the press were 
protected speech because they did not present a "substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing" the legal process). In fact, the district court never explicitly addressed 
whether Mr. Hall's proposed communications presented a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing the proceedings. (R. 35055 Vol. VI, pp.l020-1023.) 
Mr. Hall submitted a proposed list of general topics and specific questions for 
jurors who were willing to discuss their service, which he supported with citations to the 
record and applicable law. (R. 35055, Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibit 
12.).) In rejecting Mr. Hall's request, the district court's order implicitly assumes that 
Mr. Hall's attorneys will act unprofussiomilly if left to their own devices. (See infra 
Argument II.) However, until established otherwise, all Idaho attorneys are presumed to 
be capable of exercising professional discretion. As stated in the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct: 
[M]any difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues 
must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral 
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These 
principles include the lawyer's obligations, as an advocate, to 
zealously protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests within the 
bounds of the law and, as an officer of the court, to preserve the 
integrity of the legal system's search for the truth while maintaining a 
professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved 
in the process .... Lawyers playa vital role in the preservation of society. 
The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their 
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relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when 
properly applied, serve to define that relationship. 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
Even if the district court were justified in assuming ill intent or overzealousness 
on the part of Mr. Hall's attorneys, this Court has already adopted three safeguards 
designed, in part, to minimize the likelihood of any potential prejudice to the 
proceedings. These safeguards are reflected in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
First, this Court has promulgated Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (lCJl) number 
232, which provides as follows: 
The question may arise as to whether you may discuss this case with 
the attorneys or with anyone else. For your guidance, the Court instructs 
you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely 
your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you wish to, 
but you are not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the 
case with anyone at all. If you choose to, you may tell them as much or as 
little as you like, but you should be careful to respect the privacy and 
feelings of your fellow jurors. Remember that they understood their 
deliberations to be confidential. Therefore, you should limit your 
comments to your own perceptions and feelings. If anyone persists in 
discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your 
service, either before or after any discussion has begun, please report it to 
me. 
ICJI No. 232 (emphasis added). This instruction recognizes the permissibility of post-
verdict juror contact, while reducing the risk of juror harassment by empowering jurors to 
decide for themselves whether to talk to the attorneys. 
A second safeguard adopted by this Court is contained in the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct (IRPC). In relevant part, Rule 3.5 provides that, "A lawyer shall 
not ... communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if: 
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(1) the communication is prohibited by law or conrt order; (2) the juror has made known 
to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the commnnication involves 
misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment." IRPC 3.5(c). The relevant 
commentary to this rule states that: 
A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or 
prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so 
nnless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must 
respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may 
not engage in improper conduct during the commnnication. 
IRPC 3.5, Commentary, ~ 3. Thus, this rule recognizes the permissibility of juror 
contact, while minimizing the risk of juror harassment and manipUlation, by setting forth 
specific rules that Idaho attorneys must observe when communicating with discharged 
Jurors. 
A third safeguard adopted by this Court is contained in Rule 606(b) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may 
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any 
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
processes in connection therewith, nor maya juror's affidavit or evidence 
of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifYing be received for these purposes .... 
I.R.E. 606 (b). Pursuant to this rule, a juror's affidavit generally carmot be used to 
impeach the jury verdict, subject to at least four exceptions. The first three are contained 
in the rule itself, which provides: 
[AJ juror may testifY on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may 
be questioned about or may execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or 
not the jury determined any issue by resort to chance. 
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I.R.E. 606(b). The plain language of this rule assumes juror interviews are pennissible, 
but simply restricts the admissibility of the fruits of such interviews. 
The fourth "exception" is essentially a recognition by this Court that not 
everything a juror has to say falls within the scope of Rule 606(b). As this Court has 
stated: 
The role of I.R.E. 606(b) is to guide a court in detennining what evidence 
may be considered by the court to impeach a verdict. That rule, however, 
does not have application to infonnation brought forth which challenges 
other conduct of jurors during the trial, apart from their deliberations. 
Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 197, 75 P.3d 1202, 1207 (2003) 
(holding that a juror's affidavit demonstrating dishonesty during voir dire was admissible 
because dishonesty during voir dire occurs prior to deliberations). This "exception" 
recoguizes that some errors may be addressed by juror affidavits if adequate safeguards, 
such as a meaningful voir dire, were not observed during the trial process. See State v. 
DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571 (1996). 
Thus, I.RE. 606(b), and the cases interpreting it, implicitly recognize the 
propriety of conducting juror interviews. Indeed, experience and common sense 
demonstrate that juror contact may be the only means of identifying claims for which 
juror affidavits are admissible to support. 
Moreover, in all cases where a litigant has an interest in contacting jurors, this 
Court has already adopted at least three independent safeguards which effectively 
minimize the likelihood of juror harassment, manipulation, and unwarranted intrusion 
into the jury's deliberative process. For these reasons, Mr. Hall's proposed 
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communications with jurors did not present a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the 
post-conviction proceedings. 
d. The District Court's Order Is Not Narrowly Tailored To Achieve The 
State's futerest 
The rule in Gentile pennitting restrictions on an attorney's ability to make pretrial 
statements to the press was narrowly tailored, Le., written to apply only to such speech 
that was substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect on the proceedings. 
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076. In contrast, the district court's order prohibiting juror contact 
in this case is not narrowly tailored because it prohibits constitutionally protected 
communications designed to assist Mr. Hall in identifying and supporting legitimate 
claims for post-conviction relief. (See supra Argument LC.l.(a) and (c).) By its breadth 
and burden, the district court's order effectively precludes Mr. Hall from conducting any 
meaningful investigation of juror misconduct claims, or for that matter, any other claims 
that could be supported by juror affidavits. 
The district court reasoned that because the jury was instructed to consider only 
the evidence presented at trial, any post verdict communications with jurors regarding 
potential claims of juror misconduct, or bias, were unnecessary. (R. 35055 Vol. VI, 
pp.l020-1023.) Presuming the jury followed the district court's instructions may be 
relevant in determining whether a juror's affidavit is admissible, State v. DeGrat, 128 
Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571 (1996), but applying this presumption to justify an 
order precluding juror contact, goes too far. The fact is that juror misconduct does occur, 
despite thorough jury instructions and admonishments.4 Even in the absence of juror 
4 The most common types of juror misconduct involve juror exposure to matters not 
properly admitted into evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Maree & Brooks, 934 F.2d 
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misconduct, juror interviews might reveal information that leads to other potential claims 
for post-conviction relief.5 
Mr. Hall submits his attorney's speech is already effectively regulated through the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, in conjunction with other rules of the Court. 
However, even if the current framework is deemed insufficient to achieve the State's 
interests, the district court's order is not narrowly tailored for First Amendment purposes 
to address the State's interests. For instance, the district court failed to consider any 
reasonable time, place, and mauner restrictions, including but not necessarily limited to 
the following: 1) requiring that notice be given to the opposing party of the attorney's 
intent to contact jurors; 2) requiring that written documentation be provided to jurors 
identifying the attorneys or their agents, advising jurors of their right to refuse to 
communicate, or to terminate communications at any time, and reminding jurors to 
respect the privacy of other jurors; 3) requiring that juror interviews be recorded; and 
4) requiring that any juror affidavits be filed under seal to provide the district court an 
opportunity to assess its admissibility before disclosing its contents to the public. 
196 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction because juror discussed the case with friends 
who said that people like the defendant should be incarcerated); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 
F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988) (reversing a death sentence because sequestered jurors were 
told, by the owner of the restaurant where they were taken for lunch, to "fry that son of a 
bitch."); United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1962) (reversing 
conviction because juror introduced news accounts of defendant's high bail and drugs 
found in the defendant's room). 
5 For instance, jurors might provide information regarding irregularities or inadequacies 
during voir dire. If a juror was not asked about relevant background matters or exposure 
to pretrial publicity, this information may develop into an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, rather than a jury misconduct claim. Jurors can also provide information 
about potentially prejudicial events in the courtroom, such as whether they observed the 
defendant in shackles or prison garb. 
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In conclusion, considering Mr. Hall's interests, the State's interests, the 
improbability that the targeted speech will materially prejudice the proceedings, and the 
over breadth of the order, the district court's order cannot pass constitutional muster 
under the First Amendment. 
2. The District Court's Order Violates Mr. Hall's Due Process Right To 
Meaningful Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Mr. Hall has a due process right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings. See 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,401(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its 
action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the 
dictates of the Constitution--and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."); 
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862; 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing that capital 
post-conviction proceedings serve to protect a condemned person's federal and state right 
to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to 
have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"); see generally I.C. § 
19-4901 et seq., and I.C. § 19-2719. As noted in Claim I.C. (7)(a), supra, incorporated 
here by reference, Mr. Hall's attorneys have an obligation to conduct an independent and 
thorough investigation to protect his right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings. 
Mr. Hall did not require and did not request the district court's intervention to conduct 
juror interviews. Rather, the district court sua sponte interfered with Mr. Hall's 
independent investigation and, by entering its order, effectively prevented him from 
conducting a meaningful post-conviction investigation. 
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3. The District Court's Order Violates Mr. Hall's Right To Meaningful Post-
Conviction Proceedings In A Capital Case As Guaranteed By The Due 
Process Clauses And The Eighth Amendment To The U.S. Constitution 
Because this is a capital case, Mr. Hall is entitled to heightened, not lessened, 
procedural safeguards. See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 539-540 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(recognizing the "long line of cases requiring heightened procedural safeguards in capital 
cases"); Lanliford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27, (1991) (weighing the "special 
importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing context"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (discussing heightened protections in capital cases); Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (noting the Court's "often stated" principle that "there is a 
significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments''); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (finding that "the penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisomnent"). 
The ability to conduct a meaningful post-conviction investigation, including the 
ability to communicate with jurors, provides an additional safeguard against the arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty. Indeed, considering Mr. Hall's case was 
one of the first capital jury sentencing cases in Idaho, the importance of obtaining juror 
feedback about their experience is substantial. The district court's order effectively 
abolished this important safeguard without sufficient justification. See supra Claim IC 
(I)(b). For these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully submits the district court's order violates 
the Due Process and Eighth Amendment right to heightened protections in capital cases. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 19 
D. Conclusion 
The district court inserted itself into the area of juror contact, an area that has 
largely been self-regulated by the legal profession through the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, court rules, and case law. It impugns the integrity of the Idaho 
legal profession to presume attorneys and their agents will act in violation of their ethical 
duties; such a presumption is not warranted by experience. Moreover, by crafting its 
unprecedented order, the district court unnecessarily infringed on Mr. Hall's rights to free 
speech, to meaningful post-conviction proceedings, and to the additional safeguards 
afforded capital defendants. For all of these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this 
Court vacate the district court's order prohibiting juror contact, and remand his case for 
further proceedings that will allow his attorneys to conduct a meaningful post-conviction 
investigation on his behalf. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Forbidding Mr. Hall's Attorneys And Their 
Agents From Contacting Any Of The Jurors 
A. Introduction 
The district court interfered with Mr. Hall's independent investigation for 
potential post-conviction claims, and the gathering of evidence to support such claims, by 
sua sponte prohibiting his counsel from contacting any of the jurors from the underlying 
case without prior court approval. When Mr. Hall obeyed the district court's directive 
and filed a motion to permit juror contact, the district court improperly treated the motion 
as a request for discovery. As noted above, the district court's conduct is unprecedented 
and unconstitutional. Assuming arguendo the district court had the authority to enter its 
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order, Mr. Hall met the standard established by the court. Accordingly, the district court 
abused its discretion in denying any juror contact. 
B. Standard Of Review 
As noted above, the district court lacked authority to enter the order. Assuming 
arguendo the district court had authority to enter the order, the order should be reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. When reviewing a discretionary decision, this 
Court determines "(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 
768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Forbidding Mr. Hall's Attorneys 
And Their Agents From Contacting Any Of The Jurors 
On October 27, 2004, the jurors in the underlying capital case concluded their 
service with the entry of their special verdicts at the conclusion of the penalty phase of 
Mr. Hall's trial. (R. 31528 Vol. IV, pp.609-12.) Upon completion of their service, the 
district court discharged the jurors, instructing them as follows: 
The question may arise as to whether you may discuss this case with 
anyone else. For your guidance the Court instructs you that whether you 
talk to anyone is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss 
this case if you wish to, but you are not required to do so and you may 
choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to speak 
to anyone about the case you may tell them as much or as little as you like, 
but you should be careful to respect the privacy and feelings of your 
fellow jurors. Remember that they understood that their deliberations 
were to be confidential, therefore you should limit your contact, if any, to 
your own perception and feelings. If anyone persists in discussing this 
case over your obj ection, or becomes critical of your service, either before 
or after any discussion has begun please report that to me. 
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(Tr. 31528, p. 5526, Ls.2-l9( emphasis added).) 6 
After the initiation of the post-conviction proceedings, the parties entered a 
stipulation for the release of completed juror questionnaires from the underlying criminal 
case. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp.7l-73.) A telephonic hearing was held regarding the 
stipulation, during which the district court permitted the release of the jury 
questionnaires. In the course of discussing the questionnaires, the district court sua sponte 
prohibited post-conviction counsel from contacting jurors without prior court approval. 
(R 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1609; Tr. 4/09/09, p.7, L.3 - p.24, L.17,f 
Two weeks later, Mr. Hall moved the district court to reconsider its prohibition on 
juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp. 112-114.) At the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the 
district court prohibited Mr. Hall's counsel from contacting jurors, but stated it would 
entertain future motions. (Tr. 2/15/06, pA4, 1.3 -pAS, LIS.) 
6 Notably, the district court's instruction deviated from this Court's pattern instruction set 
forth in ICJI No. 232, by omitting reference to post-verdict discussions with attorneys. 
(See supra Argument LC.(l)(c) (quoting ICn No. 232 in its entirety).) This Court has 
entered an Order regarding the use of ICJI, providing in relevant part that: 
It is recommended that whenever these revised Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions contain an instruction applicable to a case and the trial judge 
determines that the jury should be instructed on that subject, the judge 
should use the instruction contained in the revised Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions, unless the judge finds that a different instruction would more 
adequately, accurately or clearly state the law. 
See Order dated October 25, 2005, at. http://www.isc.idaho.gov/cji_orderl005.htm (last 
accessed on June 19,2009). 
7 As reflected during the hearing on Mr. Hall's objection to the record, there is some 
conflict regarding the nature and scope of the discussions during the January 6, 2006 
hearing. Mr. Hall asserts that absent an affirmative waiver of the recording requirement, 
the district court erred in failing to record the proceedings. To the extent the State or the 
Court relies on the January 6, 2006 hearing to affirm the district court's rulings on the 
jury contact issue, Mr. Hall asserts he has been denied his right to a meaningful appeal 
due to the district court's failure to record that hearing. 
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On June 1,2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for juror contact and a memorandum in 
support thereof, which included the legal grounds for his motion, the reasons he believed 
the jurors had information relevant to his post-conviction claims, the procedures his 
investigator would follow when contacting jurors, and the questions he intended to ask of 
those who chose to cooperate. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.961-963; R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.l573 
(Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibit 12.).) 
On June 15, 2007, the parties addressed the recent filings and the district court 
heard the motion for juror contact on August 8, 2007. (Tr. 6/15/07, pA, Ln.9 - p.5, Ln.7.) 
During the hearing, the district court gave some insight into its analysis of the issue. 
I had an experience in a case I presided over, a rape case, early in my time 
as a District Judge, probably the '95, '96 time frame, where counsel sent 
out a private investigator named Peter Smith who showed up on people's 
doorsteps unannounced. And I - madam clerk received two or tluee 
phone calls from rather upset individuals, citizens, who had served as 
jurors in that case, including the jury foreman, as I recall, who was a 
fellow in his mid-fifties. He was no wallflower. He was a senior bank 
executive, as I recall. And they were genuinely upset and surprised and 
dismayed to have this happen. It kind of reinforced my view that it is 
important to protect the privacy of jurors who serve on difficult cases and 
that absent some extraordinary reason - and I don't think death penalty 
cases automatically qualifY as extraordinary reason - that this Court 
should go to reasonable lengths to ensure that their expectation in the 
courts when I send them away is met. We are not talking about fragile 
widows or fragile old men in nursing homes who are upset when after 
their service, they go into a nursing home and they are disturbed by this. 
We are talking about people in - at the top of their game, at the prime of 
their life, in their highest eamings capacity. I'm thinking of the banking 
executive who served as the foreman - being genuinely upset by this. And 
it was beyond rude. It was a very unpleasant surprise and upsetting, 
disturbing to the point where this individual called and others did the same 
thing. Now I will not tell you that I have high regard for Peter Smith. I 
have said that he is sleazy. I've said that on the record in multiple cases 
and it's true. It's my view, based on what he did in that case and others. 
He is profane. He is unprofessional. He's sleazy. No other way to say it. 
So he was involved in that case. So maybe by virtue of his participation in 
that case we got a reaction that was unusually strong, compared with 
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maybe what somebody else would get who volunteered in response to a 
letter from the Court. 
You are told all of that and you walk out of here as a citizen juror and you 
think you've served and it might have been the first time in your life and it 
was a major imposition in your life in terms of time and energy away from 
your family, your professional life, whatever. And then you get a -
someone showing up on your doorstep and boy, you know, it was a very 
unpleasant surprise and very disappointing to them and then, because of 
that, ultimately to me. So that's the background against which you are 
urging me to allow this process, Mr. Ackley. I do not presume because 
your client has - the petitioner in this case is the subject of a death penalty 
verdict that he automatically qualifies for this kind of contact. In my 
view, it's firm that he does not automatically by virtue of that. So kind of 
just to let you know, I've been around longer than some judges and less 
than others. I think that Judge Bail has been around here active longer 
than I have. So this is just based on my experience. Other judges may see 
this differently and they are certainly free to and I would defer to their 
view - views in this area. But this is what my experience has been and 
this is part of the reason why I am admittedly somewhat protective of 
jurors who have served. 
(Tr. 6/15/07, p.21, L.5 - p.25, L.3.) 
At this hearing, Mr. Hall further expounded on the procedures he would utilize 
when contacting jurors and submitted an example of a letter his investigator would 
provide to any of the jurors contacted. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.l573 (Exhibit 16.).) The 
district court addressed Mr. Hall's motion and arguments, and once again referenced his 
negative experiences with an unethical investigator. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.l23, L.8 - p.l28, 
L.23.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court orally denied Mr. Hall's motion 
and, a month later, memorialized the denial in a written order. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.145, L.8-
p.l45, L.21.) In denying Mr. Hall's motion, the district court found Mr. Hall had failed 
to demonstrate juror contact was necessary to protect his substantial rights. The district 
court erred by adopting what is essentially a discovery standard for juror contact. 
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Mr. Hall did not ask the court to order jury interviews through discovery or otherwise 
facilitate his contact with jurors. Thus, the district court's reliance on its authority to 
govern discovery is misplaced. Moreover, Mr. Hall submits that absent any evidence his 
attorneys or their agents committed (or intended to commit) misconduct, the district court 
exceeded its authority by entering its order. Indeed, it appears the district court was not 
relying on the experience in Mr. Hall's case, but on its own experience with an unethical 
investigator in a completely different case. Finally, Mr. Hall submits the district court 
violated Idaho law by effectively interpreting I.R.E. 606(b) in a manner not supported by 
existing law, and by creating a new rule, which abridged Mr. Hall's rights under the plain 
language of the rule and impeded his substantive right to conduct an independent and 
thorough post-conviction investigation. Under Idaho law, it is the sole province of the 
Idaho Supreme Court to create rules governing the practice and procedure in all Idaho 
courts, including the Idaho Rules of Evidence. IDAHO CONST. ART. V, § 2; Idaho Code § 
1-212. Such rules cannot be interpreted by inferior courts to "abridge, enlarge or modify 
the substantive rights of any litigant." I.C. § 1-213. 
D. Conclusion 
The district court's prohibition on juror contact without prior court approval 
interfered with Mr. Hall's independent post-conviction investigation. Moreover, when 
Mr. Hall obeyed the district court's order and filed a motion to permit juror contact, the 
district court improperly treated the motion as a request for discovery. Assuming 
arguendo the district court had the authority to enter such an order, Mr. Hall submits he 
met the standard established by the court. Accordingly, the district court abused its 
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discretion in denying Mr. Hall's request for juror contact and he respectfully requests that 
the district court's order be vacated and the case remanded for further investigation. 
III. 
The District Court's Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For A Court-Ordered Deposition 
Of His Trial Counsels' Investigator, Glenn Elam, Constitutes An Abuse Of Discretion 
Where Mr. Hall Has Demonstrated That A Deposition 
Is Necessary To Protect His Substantial Rights 
A. Introduction 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Hall's motion to depose his 
trial counsels' investigator, Glenn Elam. Mr. Hall provided a statement of claims in his 
petition to which Mr. Elam's testimony was relevant and necessary to establish the scope 
of the investigation conducted in relationship to these claims. Under the circumstances of 
this case, Mr. Hall SUbmits the requested discovery was mandatory. Alternatively, 
Mr. Hall submits that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for 
Mr. Elam's deposition because the Court's denial was based on misapplication of the 
relevant law and facts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Post-conviction discovery is left to the discretion of the district court unless the 
petitioner can show that discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights. 
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) ("Unless discovery is 
necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district court is not required to 
order discovery."); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Accordingly, the district court's order denying Mr. Hall's motion for discovery is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
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C. The District Court's Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For A Court-Ordered 
Deposition Of His Trial Counsels' Investigator, Glenn Elam, Constitutes An 
Abuse Of Discretion 
Mr. Hall has a constitutional right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings. 
See, e.g., State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing 
capital post-conviction proceedings protect a condemned person's federal and state right 
to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to 
have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"). This right is hollow 
if there is not a meaningful opportunity to develop a factual basis for all post-conviction 
claims. In some cases, petitioners must resort to court-ordered discovery to develop 
factual support for their claims. Mr. Hall identifies here the complete history of his 
attempts to obtain court ordered discovery, beginning with his motion for discovery filed 
nearly three and a half years ago. 
On January 5, 2006, Mr. Hall filed a motion for discovery in which he requested 
leave to conduct the depositions of his trial counsel and their investigator, Glenn Elam. 
(R. 35055 Vol. I, p.lOI.) At the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the district court granted 
the request to depose trial counsel but denied, without prejudice, his request to depose 
Mr. Elam. (Tr. 7/05/06, p.l77, L.19 - p.l81, L.21; R. 35055, Vol. V, p.884.) 
On December 29, 2006, after completion of trial counsels' depositions, Mr. Hall 
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion for discovery in which he 
identified multiple claims to which Mr. Elam's testimony was relevant. (R. 35055 Vol. 
VIII, p.l573 (Exhibit 10, pp.20-21.).) Most notably, Mr. Hall raised a claim that his trial 
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counsel failed to investigate an alternate perpetrator or co-perpetrator defense. (R. 35055 
Vol. II, p.152.) In his Amended Petition, Mr. Hall asserted the following: 
During these post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner has 
established that the DNA evidence actually shows that there was more 
than one perpetrator involved in the crime of rape. (Exhibit 8.) Petitioner 
has always maintained, and continues to maintain, that he did not kill 
Ms. Heuneman. Petitioner asserts that the secondary contributor to the 
DNA may have been the actual killer. During the course of this 
reinvestigation, Petitioner has identified one possible person as the source 
for the DNA evidence not yet matched. That person, Patrick Hoffert, is 
deceased. 
According to police reports, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill told 
Detective Dave Smith and Scott Birch of the Attorney General's Office 
that they had seen and spoken with Lynn Henneman near the Greenbelt on 
the night she was abducted. (Exhibit 9.) Ms. Lewis indicated that 
Ms. Henneman asked for their assistance on directions to the DoubleTree 
Inn. According to Ms. Lewis, Petitioner and Patrick Bernard Hoffert then 
arrived, at which point Petitioner spoke briefly to Ms. Henneman. Ms. Hill 
reported noticing Ms. Henneman's yellow sapphire ring and recalled that 
Petitioner left with Ms. Henneman. 
The State did not call either Ms. Lewis or Ms. Hill to testify 
despite that fact that on the surface, their testimony would appear 
incriminating of Petitioner. The reason the State did not call these 
witnesses is because there is more to the story. Specifically, the morning 
after Ms. Henneman's abduction, Patrick Hoffert, the other individual 
placed with Ms. Henneman the night before, committed suicide. (Exhibit 
10.) An investigation was conducted both by the Garden City Police 
Department and the coroner's office. 
Through reinvestigation of this case, Petitioner has obtained the 
affidavits of Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill, who confirm the information in the 
police reports. (Exhibit II, Exhibit 12.) Further, Ms. Lewis indicates that 
Deirdre Muncy, Patrick Hoffert's former girlfriend, told her that prior to 
committing suicide Patrick stated that, "he raped the girl."s When 
Ms. Lewis attempted to bring this information to the attention of the 
Garden City Police, she was told to mind her own business. Ms. Lewis 
also indicates that several years later she positively identified the woman 
she met as Lynn Henneman through a photographic array given to her by 
Detective Dave Smith of the Boise Police Department. Ms. Hill was also 
contacted by Detective Smith, but with no follow-up. This information 
does not appear in trial counsels' files and was not presented at the trial. 
8 Deirdre Muncy denied this assertion, but that alone, does not make the evidence 
inadmissible or irrelevant at a capital sentencing proceeding, especially in light of the 
other odd circumstances involving Mr. Hoffert that remain. 
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Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating 
the degree of information known but withheld by the State and further is 
awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 
5,2006. 
(R. 35055 Vol. I, pp.190-92.) 
Mr. Hall also cited the relevant deposition testimony of his trial counsel as a 
justification to depose Mr. Elam. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Exhibit 10, pp.20-21.).) 
For instance, lead trial counsel, Ami! Myshin, testified he believed Mr. Elam conducted 
interviews based on the police reports, and therefore assumed Mr. Elam interviewed 
Peggy Hill and Lisa Lewis. (Tr. 9/14/06, p.8, Ls.16-23; p.69, L.2 - p.72, L.23; p.73, 
Ls.21 - p.74, L.17.) However, co-counsel, D.C. Carr, testified the defense did not learn 
about the Hoffert incident until it was too late, Le., after trial and sentencing had 
concluded. (Tr. 9113/06, p.216, L.3 - p.220, L.15.) Elsewhere Mr. Carr testified the 
defense discussed whether to pursue an alternate perpetrator or co-perpetrator theory 
based on Patrick Hoffert, suggesting the defense was indeed aware of the possible Hoffert 
connection prior to trial. (Tr. 9/13/06, p.221, L.16 - p.225, L.1O.) Thus, Mr. Carr's 
testimony was not only interually inconsistent, but also seemingly inconsistent with 
Mr. Myshin's testimony. Accordingly, Mr. Hall asserted that "[b]ased on the underlying 
record and the depositions of both Mr. Myshin and Mr. Carr ... it is imperative he be 
allowed to depose" their investigator. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Exhibit 10, p.20).) 
On January 16, 2007, the district court heard Mr. Hall's renewed motion. The 
transcript from that hearing provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
THE COURT: But the claim is to ineffective assistance of counsel, not of 
their investigator. The investigators are only helpful to the extent that they 
bring information -- pro or con to anybody's point of view -- to their 
principal, to the trial attorney. 
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MS. SWENSEN: Mr. Elam, though, would be critical, Your Honor, in 
establishing many of the factual bases for our ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. For example, if we say that trial counsel failed to 
investigate, it's not enough just to talk to trial counsel if their response is, 
well, Mr. Elam did that. 
MR. BOURNE: ... if they've got questions, it seems to me that they 
can put it together into an affidavit that Mr. Elam can sign, if he's 
cooperative, and they can ask him questions, and he can say, yes, I spoke 
to this person, and this person gave me this information, or, no, I didn't 
speak to this information (sic) and save us three more days oflawyer time 
- well, I mean, collectively. 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the request with respect to the public 
defender's office investigator. He has been cooperative. I think it is 
simply unnecessary to depose him. It would likely result in 
substantial additional delay, and there are alternatives to it. To be 
honest, the sets of investigators that we have in this county, that I'm 
familiar with -- both for the prosecutor's office and for the public 
defender's office -- are honorable and competent individuals. . .. Part of 
what I'm considering is, it is difficult enough for trial counsel to go 
through a deposition on a case with this much import, if you will, without 
requiring investigators to do the same thing. And I'm just not -- I think 
that's a layer and a level to which it is simply not necessary to go. And 
that's a small part of my thinking, but a part nonetheless. 
(Tr. 1/16/07, p.32, 1.18 - p.36, 1.2 (emphasis added).) Thus, both the State and the 
district court suggested an affidavit from Mr. Elam, in lieu of a deposition, would be an 
appropriate alternative, on the assumption that Mr. Elam would be cooperative. 
On June 1,2007, Mr. Hall filed a sealed supplemental motion for discovery.9 (R. 
35055 Vol. VIII, p.l572 (Exhibit 2).) On August 8, 2007, the district court heard 
Mr. Hall's motion. During that hearing, Mr. Hall's counsel informed the court Mr. Elam 
9 The hearing on the motion was not sealed. Because the parties have not yet agreed to 
unseal the motion for purposes of this appeal, Mr. Hall cites solely to the transcript of the 
hearing on the motion. 
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would not sign an affidavit without the consent of Mr. Myshin, and that, to date, they had 
not been able to obtain such consent. As a result, Mr. Hall was moving for a court-
ordered deposition. (Tr. 8/16/07, p.61, L.19 - p.63, L.10.) The transcript from that 
hearing provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
MR. ACKLEY: ... That was our goal, is simply to ask for an affidavit, 
rather than do a deposition. So it's really kind of come to this. 
MR. BOURNE: ... I think their investigator could supply his own 
affidavit of what Glenn Elam said, and that would place in motion my 
ability to speak to Mr. Elam and confirm that their investigator's affidavit 
is correct. ... 
THE COURT: Last word? 
MR. ACKLEY: Actually, we're fine with that. Our only concern was 
whether that would be objected to on admissibility grounds. But I'm 
hearing the State wouldn't have an objection to us attaching that to our --
either submitting it ahead of time or attaching it to our final petition. 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't know that the State has committed too 
much, except to say that you have the option, Mr. Ackley, of submitting 
an affidavit from Mr. Shaw. I'm not sure I heard them say about whether 
they would be objecting to hearsay with it or not. 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. Well, I just simply wouldn't want to delay this 
process so that we submit an affidavit from Mr. Shaw and then the State 
objects to compelling depositions, and then in addition says, "By the way, 
depositions at this point are just going to delay the case even further." So 
our preference would be for the Court to order depositions. And if that 
doesn't compel the cooperation, that would resolve the need for 
depositions, then at least we have this process moving now rather than 
having us file an affidavit first and then the State speaking to Mr. Elam or 
Mr. Myshin about this and us coming back ad saying this is where we are 
and the State objects to depositions and objects to Mr. Shaw's affidavit. 
I'm just trying to cut through some of that. That happens way too often 
and then delay gets blamed on petitioner for that kind of thing. So our 
motion is really for the depositions .... 
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THE COURT: '" I'll deny the motion to compel an affidavit -- I'm sorry, 
compel a deposition of the Ada County public defender's office 
investigator, Mr. Glenn Elam. He is - it's obvious he's not a decision-
maker on what evidence was introduce or known or not known, known 
about and not introduced .... And I think an affidavit of Mr. Shaw may 
be an alternative. 
(Tr. 8/08/07, p.63, L.I0 -p.66, L.5 (emphasis added).) 
On August 23, 2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for permission to appeal with the 
district court. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.996-1006.) Mr. Hall included with the motion an 
affidavit from his investigator, Michael Shaw, in which Mr. Shaw described multiple 
interviews with Glenn EJam. In relevant part, Mr. Shaw stated the following: 
Mr. Elam said there were some strange facts in the case that stood out in 
his mind involving a man who lived near the place Lynn Henneman's 
. body was found in Garden City. 
Mr. Elam said the man and his wife argued in their trailer around the night 
the body was discovered, and that when she left that night to go buy beer, 
he killed himself with a gun. Mr. Elam said the man and his wife were 
acquaintances of Erick Hall. Mr. Elam told me he never found the wife 
but had always wanted to interview her. 
Mr. Elam also told me he made audio recordings of interviews with a 
couple of people who told him they saw Lynn Henneman when she was 
lost in Garden City and asking for directions on the night of her 
disappearance. 
I reviewed an August 12,2004 audio recording Mr. Elam made of a 27.5 
minute interview with Lisa Lewis. . .. Ms. Lewis describes the person she 
saw in Garden City on September 24, 2000 as Lynn Henneman, and says 
she has no doubts about her identification because she subsequently saw 
photographs of Ms. Henneman on television when she was reported 
missing. 
Approximately six minutes into the interview, Mr. Elam asks Ms. Lewis 
why she thinks Mr. Hoffert committed suicide. Ms. Lewis says she heard 
Deidre Muncie state that Mr. Hoffert had raped a girl. Approximately 
seventeen minutes into the interview, Ms. Lewis again states Ms. Muncie 
told her Mr. Hoffert raped a girl, and that Ms. Muncie said this repeatedly. 
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Mr. Elam indicated in the recording that Ms. Lewis would be 
subpoenaed to testify at Erick Hall's trial. 
Mr. Elam said he always thought Mr. Hoffert's suicide was strange in 
relation to Ms. Henneman's disappearance, but the trial team chose not to 
use it. Mr. Elam reiterated that he could not find Ms. Muncie, although he 
had very much wanted to interview her, and asked that I let him know 
what I found out ifI got in touch with her. 
When I asked Mr. Elam whether he recalled Ms. Lewis telling him she 
heard Ms. Muncie say anything about Mr. Hoffert raping a girl, Mr. Elam 
did not recall the statement. Mr. Elam said if Ms. Lewis had made such a 
statement to him, it was probably because of a lack of specificity in 
referring to a 'girl' that caused him not to follow up. 
On January 24, 2007, I contacted Mr. Elam to ask if he would be willing 
to sign an affidavit stating the following: 
Mr. Elam interviewed Lisa Lewis on August 12, 2004, and 
obtained information about Erick Hall, Lynn Henneman, and 
Patrick Hoffert. 
Mr. Elam attempted to locate and interview Deirdre Muncie, but 
was unsuccessful in doing so. 
On February 9, 2007, Mr. Elam contacted me and stated that he could only 
sign an affidavit if the lead attorney on the case for the Ada County Public 
Defenders, Ami! Myshin, approved such an action. 
Mr. Myshin did not respond to my efforts to contact him. 
(R 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 13, Appendix 11, pp.l-3).) 
On September 17, 2007, the district court entered a written order denying 
Mr. Hall's request to depose Mr. Elarn, stating that "[n]o showing has been made by the 
petitioner that [the] deposition is necessary to protect his substantial rights." (R. 35055 
Vol. VI, p.l 046.) 
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A month later, the court held a hearing and denied Mr. Hall's motion for 
permission to appeal from the bench. During that hearing, the district court expounded 
upon its reasons for denying the deposition of Mr. Elam, and commented on Mr. Shaw's 
affidavit. 
THE COURT: ... Counsel seem to be saying, in effect, since Mr. Elam 
won't sign the affidavit we drafted for him, we want to put him through a 
deposition. Seems to be kind of a -- you know, almost a punishment .... 
But we need diligent trial counsel to be willing -- who are competent, and 
professional, and diligent, and energetic to be willing to do this work ... 
And if -- if we start putting their staff -- staffs and staff members through 
full blown depositions, I just worry whether, in the long run, anybody is 
going to be willing to do this work, and I mean on the defense side, of a 
capital case. And I'm concerned about that. And I'll admit to you that has 
-- is part of my -- is part of what I've considered, in the whole world of 
things I've considered. This work is essential. If we drive good, diligent 
defense lawyers out of the business, because they don't want to be 
harassed in each and every case, and have all members of their staff 
harassed with depositions, without any indication of why it's appropriate, 
we're going to have people left, only people left, who don't have other 
choices for what they can do for a living. . .. I'm looking at an affidavit 
of Michael -- Michael J. Shaw, who is an investigator for the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office, Capital Litigation Unit. ... where he 
says - [")Mr. Elam contacted me and stated he could only sign an affidavit 
if the lead attorney on the case, for the Ada County Public Defender, Ami! 
Myshin, approved such action.[") You know, there are conditions to his 
employment. He's got to work, he's -- he's got to -- got to make a living . 
. . . And so saying somebody was, quote, not fully cooperative, referring 
to -- close quote, referring to Mr. Elam, because he won't sign your 
affidavit ... I just think that that's hyperbole, that's an overstatement, to 
say that Mr. Elam has not been fully cooperative. There's been no real 
evidence, before me, of that. 
(Tr. 11115/07, p.l7, L.l6 - p.21, L.23.) 
To obtain court-ordered discovery, a petitioner must identify specific areas 
wherein discovery is requested, and explain why those areas are necessary to protect his 
substantial rights. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) 
("Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district 
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court is not required to order discovery."); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 973 P.2d 
749 (Ct. App. 1999). Mr. Hall submits that under the circumstances of this case, he has 
made a sufficient showing of relevance and necessity such that his requested discovery 
was mandatory. 
Alternatively, Mr. Hall submits the district court erred in exercising its discretion 
by misapplying the relevant law and facts. As to the law, in denying Mr. Hall's request 
for a court-ordered deposition of Mr. Elam, the district court repeatedly emphasized 
Mr. Elam's role as an investigator, not a lawyer. (Tr. 1/16/07, p.32, Ls.18-19 ("But the 
claim is to ineffective assistance of counsel, not of their investigator."); Tr. 8/08/07, p.65, 
1.24 - p.66, 1.2 ("it's obvious he's not a decision-maker on what evidence was introduce 
or known or not known, known about and not introduced.").) The district court failed to 
appreciate that, as a matter of law, a complete understanding of the scope of counsels' 
investigation is necessary to assess their performance. See e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 690-691 (1984) ("counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or 
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."); 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (noting that when assessing counsel's 
choices, courts should first focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable). As 
trial counsels' investigator, Glenn E1am played an integral part in Mr. Hall's 
representation during the underlying criminal proceedings, and is in the best position to 
describe the nature and scope of his investigative efforts. Accordingly, an essential 
component of post-conviction counsels' investigation included interviewing Mr. E1am. 
See Hertz, R., and Liebman, J., Federal Habeas Comus Practice and Procedure (Fifth 
Ed.), pp.533-536 n.25 (noting that an investigator is a potential source of information for 
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claims of "ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to pretrial investigation."). 
Mr. Hall demonstrated to the district court that trial counsel could not provide either a 
complete or accurate description of their investigation. Thus, the district court's denial of 
Mr. Hall's request to depose Mr. Elarn prevents Mr. Hall from fully developing his 
claims. See Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541, 548 (11th Cir. 1983) (relying in part on the 
denial of depositions at the state post-conviction level in finding that federal habeas 
petitioner had been denied a full and fair opportunity to develop facts to support his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); see generally Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 
1009 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Denial of an opportunity for discovery is an abuse of discretion 
when the discovery is necessary to fully develop the facts of a claim." (citation 
omitted)·iO 
As to the facts, the district court erroneously found Mr. Elam had been fully 
cooperative with Mr. Hall's investigation, despite multiple assertions by post-conviction 
counsel, and even a sworn statement from their investigator, that Mr. Elam had provided 
relevant and necessary infonnation to further his claims, but had refused to sign an 
affidavit. (Tr. 11115/07, p.21, Ls.20-23 ("1 just think that that's hyperbole, that's an 
overstatement, to say that Mr. Elam has not been fully cooperative. There's been no real 
evidence, before me, ofthat.").) Moreover, the district court relied on its erroneous, or at 
least irrelevant belief that if it ordered a deposition of Mr. Elam in this case, then 
competent defense lawyers and their investigators would not handle future capital cases. 
(Tr. 11/15/07, p.l8, Ls.13-20 ("if we start putting their staff ... through fuJI blown 
10 Both Coleman v. Zant and Jones v. Wood addressed the rules governing discovery in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
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depositions, I just worry whether, in the long run, anybody is going to be willing to do 
this work . . . is part of what I've considered, in the whole world of things I've 
considered.").) Thus, the district court's decision was not consistent with applicable legal 
standards or a sound factual analysis. For these reasons, Mr. Hall submits the district 
court abused its discretion. 
As a final matter, in his memorandum in support of his motion for discovery, 
Mr. Hall asserted that because this is a capital case, the district court should liberally 
allow discovery of all relevant requested information. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 
(Exhibit 2, p. 7).) It does not appear this Court has ever addressed whether capital cases 
should be treated any differently than non-capital cases for purposes of post-conviction 
discovery. In this appeal, Mr. Hall maintains that due to the heightened protections 
afforded by the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to capital defendants 
generally, a district court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of disclosure 
when discovery is not otherwise mandatory. See, e.g.. Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967, 
971 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (recognizing that "more liberal discovery is appropriate in capital 
cases where the stakes for petitioner are so high." (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
604 (1978).) Mr. Hall submits this Court should adopt a "good cause" standard for 
discovery in capital cases. Under such a standard, a petitioner "need not show that the 
additional discovery would definitely lead to relief. Rather, he need only show good 
cause that the evidence sought would lead to relevant evidence regarding his petition." 
Payne, 89 F.Supp.2d at 970. Alternatively, Mr. Hall asserts because this is a capital case, 
that fact should at least be considered when district courts exercise their discretion under 
the Raudebaugh standard. 
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D. Conclusion 
Mr. Hall has a substantial interest in supporting his claims for post-conviction 
relief. In this case, a deposition of Mr. Elam appears to be the only way to obtain all the 
information necessary to fully support Mr. Hall's claims. Accordingly, for the reasons 
stated above, Mr. Hall submits he is entitled to a court ordered deposition of Mr. Elam. 
Alternatively, Mr. Hall submits that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
request to depose Mr. Elaru. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's orders 
denying his motion for juror contact and to depose Mr. Elam, and remand this case for 
further investigation and proceedings. 
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